Previous work in the area of new product development (NPD) has focused mainly on the role of design in downstream value chain activities. In this field study, conducted at a leading avionics guidance systems manufacturer, we gathered primary data on time and cost performance of both the design and manufacturing phases of customized systems. We modeled the impact of the management levers relating to oversight, the intensity of specialization in design and the level of interaction with the customer. Our model recommends appropriate managerial strategies based on the relative resources required in the design and manufacturing phases. The study highlights the necessity of leveraging the interdependency between the design and manufacturing phases to achieve superior performance in both financial and time metrics.
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Introduction.
New products are a source of competitive advantage for firms in a wide range of industries such as cars, toys, electronic gadgets and computer software (Clark and Fujimoto 1991) . New product development (NPD) is also important because it allows firms to evolve with their marketing and technical environments (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995) . During the last 20 years, several articles in academic literature (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995; Cohen, Eliashberg, and Ho 2000; Eppinger 2001 ; Krishnan and Ulrich 2001; Lee et al. 2000; Novak and Eppinger 2001) as well as the popular press e.g., (Business-Week 1992) have focused on methods of effective NPD. It is widely accepted in both the marketing literature e.g., (Urban and Hauser 1993) and the production literature e.g., (Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark 1988 ) that NPD can be considered to take place in several steps, which are largely sequential, though there may be some overlap. In the spirit of this past literature, we define NPD to be the process of conceptualizing, designing, manufacturing, assembling and testing a new product. For purposes of simplicity, we group the conceptualization and design development into one phase that we call design; similarly we group the manufacturing, assembly and testing phases into a phase we call manufacturing.
Each of these two phases has a time and a cost associated with it, both budgeted and actual. Work in the design phase of NPD entails the specification of design parameters, the detailed design of components, the determination of precedence relations in the assembly, the material and process selection for manufacturing and tests for system performance. The outputs of the first phase consist of geometric models of assemblies and components, extensive performance analyses, a bill of materials and control documentation for production (Pahl and Beitz 1988) . Our definition of NPD implies that in some environments, the time and cost of the design phase is a reasonably high percentage of the entire time and cost respectively, of the NPD process. Design therefore plays a critical role in the overall NPD process.
Increased attention to design also arises due to its potential impact downstream on manufacturing.
Design has been postulated to affect both cost and lead time in manufacturing. In the operations literature (Desai et al. 2001; Fisher 1997) , it has been pointed out that appropriate investments in design lower unit cost. Several studies have suggested that design often determines 80% (or a similar large percentage) of manufacturing cost (Miller 1988; Ullman 1992) . Ulrich and Pearson (1998) state "Because the design activity specifies the materials, part production processes and assembly requirements of a product, product design is one of the determining factors of manufacturing cost." Several works have also suggested that design can potentially affect the manufacturing and assembly lead times downstream, with extensive literature on design for assembly (DFA) or design for manufacturing (DFM) (Coleman 1988; Miller 1988; Ulrich et al. 1993 ). Indeed, DFM has been a key part of the curriculum at many engineering and business schools for over two decades (Eppinger, Fine, and Ulrich 1990) .
Cost and Time in NPD
Most of the prior work described above has treated different aspects of design as independent variables, and usually considered the cost and / or time in manufacturing or the entire development process as the dependent variable. Our study is unique in that it looks at the lead times and cost of both the design and manufacturing phases, and treats each one as a separate dependent variable, affected by managerial levers in the design phase. This aspect of our work is important, since, as pointed out earlier, in some environments, the cost and time in the design phase comprise a significant percentage of the NPD process. By examining the two phases separately, we are able to get insights into the interdependencies between these phases in NPD.
Next, we describe the aspects of the design process that have been previously used as drivers of these metrics, and then position our study in that context.
Design Drivers Influencing NPD
While it is accepted that design affects costs and lead times, past studies have focused on different aspects of design. One body of work in the production literature (Ulrich et al. 1993; Ulrich and Pearson 1998) looks at the content of the design (e.g., the number of parts, the complexity of each part), while another body of work, in both the marketing and production literatures, looks at the management of the design process e.g., (Allen 1971; Allen 1977; Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Griffin and Hauser 1992; Ha and Porteus 1995) . In this study we focus on the management of the design process. Several factors describing the management of the NPD process (which includes design and subsequent phases) have been studied in the past. These include the cross-functional nature of the NPD team, the external and internal communications of the team, the political power of the project manager and the degree of customer and supplier involvement. A good discussion of some of these factors can be found in (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995; Krishnan and Ulrich 2001) . We focus on three drivers related to the management of the design phase of NPD: i) the degree of specialization input in design, ii) the degree of oversight by the project manager in the design phase and iii) the intensity of customer interaction during design. Next we position each of these managerial levers in the context of earlier work.
(i) Specialization:
Specialization captures the degree of involvement of specialists during the design phase. In complex engineered products, such as in our field study, there are usually many aspects of design, such as kinematics design, electrical design and thermal design. This necessitates bringing in designers with specialized skills during the design process. This notion of specialization should be distinguished from the idea of cross-functionality in the design process. The latter has been studied extensively in both the marketing and operations areas. Cross-functionality represents the participation of multiple functions such as engineering, procurement, marketing and accounting in all stages of the NPD process. Such a representation by various functions has been shown to be beneficial in past work. Studies in the marketing area include (Carmel 1995; Griffin 1997; Gupta and Wilemon 1990; Mabert, Muth, and Schemner 1992; Moenart and Souder 1996; Rochford and Rudeluis 1992) and in the operations literature include (Krishnan, Eppinger, and Whitney 1997; Ulrich and Ellison 1999) . It is thus generally accepted in both literatures, that involving personnel from different functions at various stages in the NPD process leads to superior performance. Specialization, in our context, is complementary to cross-functionality. It indicates representation within the function while cross functionality is representation across various functions. Thus, specialization is intra-function, while cross functionality is inter-function. Specifically, with regard to the design phase, cross-functionality refers to the extent of input from non-design personnel in the design phase. In contrast, specialization refers to the degree of input from experts in specialized sub-functions in design. This is the first study that looks at the effects of specialization in design teams on NPD project performance. At our research site, the degree of specialization during design significantly varied across projects, whereas the degree of crossfunctionality was similar.
Increased specialization could be argued to be either beneficial or adverse. While having a higher specialization is potentially useful for complex design processes, negative impacts can occur. For instance, specialist designers are scarce resources and tend to work on multiple projects concurrently, leading to issues of congestion. This is highlighted by Adler et al. (1995) , who model the design process and show that increased specialization implies that specialists works on multiple projects. This can lead to possible congestion effects. Second, specialist design hours carry premium billing rates, leading to potentially greater costs in the design phase. Third, increased intensity of specialization in design leads to a sub-system focus, rather than a system focus. This necessitates co-ordination across specialists to achieve superior system performance.
All these potentially adverse impacts have to be weighed against benefits that could be accrued with higher intensity of specialization in design. First, specialists are better able to steer the design of sub-systems to match customer requirements. Second, specialist designers can better deploy design for manufacturing concepts within their own area of influence, thereby enhancing downstream manufacturing performance. Third, as stated in (Nobeoka 1995; Nobeoka and Cusamano 1997) , specialists can leverage their experience across multiple projects to reduce required development hours and utilize better learning across different projects, where their expertise is sought. Our analysis highlights the magnitude and the nature of such tradeoffs from specialization in design intensive environments.
(ii) Oversight:
The second factor we study is the degree of oversight by the project manager in the design phase.
The effects of oversight in NPD projects are not well understood. This lack of research is recognized by Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) who state "Surprisingly, however, there is very little research about appropriate internal management skill for project leaders … ." Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) show that more frequent milestones and frequent iterations of product design (implying greater oversight) are better for the design of products that are immature, and where there is uncertainty in the design process; while a more structured approach is appropriate for the design of mature products like automobiles. In the latter case, there is less uncertainty in design.
In the production literature, Ha and Porteus (1995) point out the tradeoffs between too much oversight (increased lead-times) and too little oversight (not enough communication between team members and poorer quality designs). In their survey of past NPD work, Krishnan and Ulrich (2001) state "…practitioners seem to struggle to strike the right balance between excessive intervention and inadequate oversight.".
Similarly, in the marketing literature, there has been extensive work on managerial controls, which are usually divided into process (or behavioral) controls and outcome controls. Process controls occur when managers specify the means used to achieve goals, and monitor the activities pursued. Outcome controls occur when managers set deliverables, and evaluate the results, regardless of the process followed. Our study of oversight corresponds to process controls. There is some dichotomy in the literature on the effects of process control on NPD outcomes. On one hand, empirical work e.g., (Cooper 1993; Wheelwright and Clark 1992) suggests that NPD success is affected positively by process management. In fact, in the production literature, specific process management methodologies such as the phase-gate process (Cooper 1993) , the quality function deployment method (Hauser and Clausing 1988) and the design structure matrix (DSM) (Eppinger, Fine, and Ulrich 1990; Eppinger 2001; Steward 1981) , have been praised in both the academic and popular press (Bonner, Ruekert, and Walker 1998) . On the other hand, earlier work by (Ouchi 1979; Ouchi and Maguire 1975) and more recent work by (Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan 1993) suggest that heavy reliance on formal process controls is counterproductive for NPD. For example, Bonner, Ruekert, and O.C. Walker (1998) find that greater team autonomy (implying less formal control by the project manager) positively affects the schedule and cost of NPD, as well as the satisfaction of the team with the outcome. In this study, we contribute to this literature in both the marketing and operations areas by studying the opposing influences of managerial oversight in the design phase of NPD.
(iii) Intensity Of Customer Interaction:
The third factor we study is the effect of customer interaction on performance metrics, and its interaction with the two managerial levers in design, described earlier: specialization and oversight. While the interaction of the NPD teams with external members of the organization (outside the team), has been well studied (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995) , the effect of user (customer) interaction in the design phase has received less attention. There is growing recognition in the literature that customer interaction leads to shorter lead times (Cooper 1995; Gupta and Souder 1998) . As discussed in (Thomke and Nimgade 2000) , "Designers often seek perfection which could potentially lead to cost and time overruns -also known as creeping elegance". Increased customer interaction mitigates this creep. Constant communication with the customer also leads to less design rework, leading to better financial and time performance in the design phase. There is however a paucity of research on the interaction of the degree of customer interaction with other management drivers such as the degree of oversight and the intensity of specialization during design. In this work, we attempt to quantify these interactions and assess their separate impact on both financial and time performance in the design and manufacturing phases.
To summarize, the primary contribution of this work is the following. We examine the effects of the managerial levers: degree of design oversight and intensity of specialization in design on the time and financial performance in both the design and manufacturing phases. We jointly examine the performances in both phases as separate dependent variables and develop insights into strategic choices of the management levers. From a marketing standpoint, we study the differential impact of customer interaction on financial and time performance in the design phase. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the research site and data collection method, defines the measures for the variables used in the study, and frames the hypotheses for testing. Section 3 describes the model and estimation results. Section 4 describes the managerial implications of our findings. We conclude with limitations and directions for future work in section 5.
Research Issues And Data Collection
The unit of analysis for our study is the individual NPD project. As pointed out in section 1, the independent variables in our study are specialization, oversight and customer interaction. The dependent variables are the financial and time performance for the design and manufacturing phases of an NPD project.
Research Site
The research site for the study was CARCO electronics, a leading designer and manufacturer of advanced missile guidance systems. The customer base of CARCO represents leading companies in the aerospace industry in the US (e.g., Lockheed Martin and Boeing), as well as defense departments of foreign governments. The design of the guidance systems is highly customized and involves the simulation of flight-guidance of missiles, with precise monitoring of critical parameters such as vibration, temperature, rotational and linear speeds. Each application requires unique avionics, with customers demanding leading edge technologies in terms of materials, software, sensors as well as computational power to enhance missile performance. Thus, the level of design commonality across CARCO's products is low, with the motion simulators and controls tailored for specific projects. Another reason for low commonality is the funding associated with defense projects, where each project is self-contained, with limited ability to share resources across projects. An overview of the NPD process at CARCO is shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2. Overview of Carco Design and Manufacturing Phases
All contracts at CARCO are fixed price contracts. Prices for contracts are negotiated by senior management during the pre-contract phase, at which point very limited design effort is expended.
As shown in figure 2, once the contract with its specifications is awarded, the bulk of the design effort is started. This involves bringing in designers that have generalist engineering design skills, as well as designers with very specialized skills in areas such as strength of materials, materials fracture, thermal effects, electronic hardware, control circuits. Several of these design tasks can be accomplished by generalist designers as well. According to project managers at CARCO, generalist designers cost less but tend to be less efficient than specialist designers for complex design tasks. Project managers have budgeting responsibility for the total budget and the budget for specialist designers, in the design phase. As per our interviews, this decision is often based on the prior experience and preferences of the project manager. Thus, the intensity of specialization represents an important managerial decision in projects at CARCO, and there is a wide variation in this regard across projects.
A second decision that managers make is the level of supervision by them in the design phase.
Project managers at CARCO have to establish a schedule to monitor the design task and conduct status reviews for the detailed design phase. The duration of the design phase, as well as the design budget, vary substantially across projects due to the high degree of customization, and involve significant outlays in money and time. Thus, some project managers prefer to finely decompose the tasks in the phase, whereas others tend to limit their oversight. For projects of similar size and design complexity, we observed wide variations in the degree of oversight.
As mentioned in section 1, our focus was also to examine how customer interaction and the managerial levers described above, jointly impacted the outcomes in each phase. Customer interaction also varies widely in the design phase of CARCO. The decision of when to involve the customer, and to what extent, is largely determined by the scale of the design phase (with higher design budgets implying more signoffs) and by the project manager. Some project managers favor extensive customer interaction, and plan for a higher level of signoffs for similar size projects compared to others.
The budgets drawn out by CARCO Electronics as part of the bidding process tend to be extremely detailed in both the design and the manufacturing phases. Both time and costs are carefully budgeted prior to submitting a bid. Furthermore, the actual time and cost performance of projects in both phases is also carefully recorded during project execution. The variation of management approaches across the projects, as well as the detailed availability of performance data provided us with a natural experiment to tease out the differential impacts of oversight, specialization and intensity of customer interaction as practiced by the various project managers.
Data Collection
Project data at CARCO were collected for 53 distinct projects, completed during the period 1993-2001. For each project, we interviewed personnel from marketing, design, engineering, manufacturing and accounting, and collected project specific data to capture the resources planned and expended during both the design and manufacturing phases. Wherever possible, triangulation was performed to confirm the accuracy of the data. Eleven projects were dropped because of missing data. Statistical checks were performed to ensure that no bias had resulted.
The total project budgets varied from $2,200 to $290,000. Table 1 provides the key summary statistics for the portfolio of 42 projects in our field study 1 . All the project managers at CARCO during this observation period were represented in the study.
Key Project Characteristic

Mean Value Standard deviation
Size of Total Budget $220,000 $125,000 Project Duration 188 weeks 102 weeks We first conducted a preliminary analysis of the project performance data. A scatter plot of the time and financial performance across all the projects in our data set, shown in figure 3, indicates a wide variation in overall project outcomes. In terms of overall project schedules (shown on the X-axis), some projects were completed approximately 35% ahead of schedule, while others slipped as late as 20% behind schedule. From an overall financial performance standpoint (shown on the Y-axis), some projects ended up with cost savings of approximately 32%, and a few exceeded their allocated budgets by over 50%.
The first question from the plot was whether overall project management ability explained this variation in performance. There appears to be no direct relationship between the time and financial metrics. If there were such a relationship, then overall project management ability could have been the underlying factor. Since the data did not seem to suggest this, we explored a second question: could it have been that projects that committed more design resources (than planned) perform better overall? In other words, does up front investment in design pay off? Projects that spent more design time (than budgeted) are shown as squares in the scatter plot. Those that spent less than their budgeted time are shown as diamonds. Despite this partitioning, we saw no compelling evidence to suggest that investments in design lead to better overall project performance on either metric. Next, we describe the operationalization of the variables used in our study.
Overall Project Time and Cost Performance
Research Variables
Independent Management Levers:
Specialization in design represents the intensity of deployment of input from specialists during design. Project managers differed in their strategies regarding specialization in design. For projects with similar design budgets, we observed a significant variation across managers in terms of the extent of specialist deployment. Some chose allocate higher amounts of design resources for specialists than others. Since each project represented a one of a kind customized guidance system, there were no scale economies.
Specialization in design, thus can be captured along two dimensions: a) the percentage 2 of design resources allocated to specialist designers, and b) the number of specialties 3 . The first dimension captures the "aggregate" intensity of specialization during design and the second accounts for the "diversity" of skills deployed. The need for distinguishing between these two measures is highlighted by the hypothetical example in table 2. In this example, all three projects have the same overall design budgets of $40,000. Projects 1 and 2 have the same total dollar outlay for specialists but differ in the number of specialties. On the other hand, projects 2 and 3 have the same number of specialties but allocate differing amounts of total resources for specialization ($4,000 versus $8,000). This underscores the need for both measures a) and b) for specialization. Given the sensitive nature of the defense projects in this field study, details for b) were restricted, and were made available only for a representative sample of projects. Analysis of this sample of projects revealed a high correlation of 0.87 between b) and a). This high correlation implies that whenever specialists are brought in, irrespective of their specialty, they are engaged for similar percentages of the design budget. In view of this, a) captures the effects of b) at our research site.
Overall
Therefore, we use a) to jointly capture both the dimensions of specialization, and operationalize it as follows
SP = (Budget For Specialist Designers) X 100 (Total Design Budget)
In our data set, the variation in SP was 4% to 95%.
The second independent variable in our study is oversight. Managerial oversight is the degree of managerial control that is exercised by the project manager. At CARCO (as in most organizations), the project managers monitored each project by tracking specific tasks performed by the design team. We observed project managers with similar design budgets adopting varying levels of oversight, with some projects having a high degree of micro-management, and others with infrequent interventions by the project manager. Project managers did confirm that projects with higher design budgets required proportionately higher number of tasks to be monitored. To compare the intensity of project monitoring meaningfully across projects, we normalized the number of tasks monitored in the design phase by the overall design budget. Hence oversight is defined as:
OV = (Number of tasks monitored in the Design Phase) (Total Design budget)
In our data set, the variation in OV across projects was 0.06 to 3.51 4 .
The third driver of performance is the intensity of customer interaction during the design phase.
Project managers confirmed that higher design budgets represented more complex projects and necessitated a proportionately higher number of customer signoffs. These represented specific checkpoints at various stages of the design evolution, where the customer had to approve and signoff. However, for projects with similar design budgets, some managers preferred far more interaction with customers and arranged a greater number of signoffs. Thus, after controlling for the design budget, the projects in our data set showed a wide variation in the intensity of customer signoffs in the design phase. Therefore, we operationalize the degree of customer interaction to be:
warrant more than one specialist for a given specialty in any project.
CUSTINT = (Number of customer signoffs in design phase) (Total Design Budget)
In our data set, the variation in CUSTINT was 0.28 to 3.48.
We also create two interaction variables that capture the interaction between intensity of customer interaction and the other two independent variables (specialization and oversight). These interaction variables are defined as the products of the respective pair of variables, as shown below:
SP-CUSTINT = SP* CUSTINT
OV-CUSTINT = OV* CUSTINT
The need for these interaction variables is explained later when we frame the hypotheses in section 2.4.
Project Performance Metrics:
A unique aspect of our field study is that we examine the effects of the managerial levers discussed above, on performance metrics in both the design and manufacturing phases of NPD.
For each phase, we tracked the time and financial performance of the project. The time performance is measured by the timeliness of the completion of each phase, with positive numbers indicating completion of that phase ahead of schedule. Inter project comparison is accomplished by normalizing by the budgeted time in each phase. We therefore define the following time performance metrics for the design and manufacturing phases, respectively: Likewise, there are parallel financial metrics in each of the two phases that reflect adherence to the respective budget. They indicate the cost overruns or savings, relative to the budget allocation. Positive numbers indicate lower expenditures relative to allocations, resulting in savings in that phase. We observed that projects varied in terms of budget allocations in the two phases. Therefore, the financial metrics we used at the phase level were:
DES-SVNGS = (Cost Savings in the Design Phase) X 100 (Total Design budget)
MFG-SVNGS =(Cost Savings in the Manufacturing Phase) X 100 (Total Manufacturing budget)
As figure 3 indicates, the projects exhibited a wide range in budget overruns and schedule slippage at the aggregate level 5 . A key objective in this study was to identify the underlying structural variables relating to management levers and intensity of customer interaction that would explain the differences in performance.
Hypotheses
In our model, we have 4 dependent variables (DES-SCHED, DES-SVNGS, MFG-SCHED, MFG-SVNGS), shown later in the columns of table 3 and three independent variables (OV, SP, CUSTINT) and two interaction variables (OV-CUSTINT, SP-CUSTINT) shown as rows in table
3. In addition, there are two instrumental variable 6 (est. DES-SCHED and est. DES-SVNGS).
Next we postulate the key hypotheses 7 .of the associations between these sets of variables and summarize it in table 3. The numbering of the hypotheses indicates the pair (dependent variable, 5 Aggregate project performance is the weighted sum of the performance in the two phases. 6 The reason for the use of this instrumental variable is explained later in this section and in section 3, where we discuss the structural form of the system of equations. 7 For brevity, only some hypotheses shown in Our first set of hypotheses (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d ) pertain to the first dependent variable: DES-SCHED. It measures the conformance to the schedule in the design phase. Since design is a creative process (Adler et al. 1995) , more oversight results in a more detailed consideration of downstream manufacturing concerns, as well as non-design related activities such as presentation preparation, meetings, reviews (Ha and Porteus 1995) . On the other hand, Ha and Porteus (1995) and Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) also emphasize that more oversight would lead to better control. Managers have thus expressed opposing opinions pertaining to the direction of influence of OV. Given the high level of design complexity for the products in our study, we test the hypothesis of a negative influence of OV on DES-SCHED.
Hypothesis 1a: Higher values of OV will lead to lower values of DES-SCHED.
Increased specialization could be beneficial or adverse to time performance. While having a higher specialization is potentially useful for complex design processes, negative impacts can occur. For instance, with higher specialization, designers work on multiple projects concurrently, leading to issues of congestion (Adler et al. 1995) . On the contrary, specialists can leverage their prior experiences in their area of functional expertise and hence complete the design task in a more timely manner (Nobeoka 1995; Nobeoka and Cusamano 1997) . Since the design process in this study is highly complex, we hypothesize that a higher intensity of specialization in design should have payoff in terms of faster execution of the design phase, offsetting the potential negative impact due to congestion effects.
Hypothesis 1b: Higher values of SP will lead to higher values of DES-SCHED
Next, we capture the effect of the intensity of customer interaction (CUSTINT) on the design schedule. Listening to the customer, on the one hand, requires substantial time commitment, leading to engineering changes and delays during the design phase. Schedules are likely to slip and this is captured in hypothesis 1c, which stipulates an adverse impact on the design schedule with high intensities of customer interaction:
Hypothesis 1c: Higher values of CUSTINT will lead to lower values of DES-SCHED
On the other hand, the organization can leverage input from the customer with the right amount of customer interaction. Project managers can utilize signoffs with the customer to co-ordinate across sub-system design. Iansiti (1998) has emphasized this role of project managers as T experts, who have both adequate depth of knowledge, as well as the breadth to reduce system level design rework. The specialists can also use the customer signoffs to better understand the requirements of the customer (Cooper 1995; Gupta and Souder 1998) . A better understanding of requirements by specialists leads to less design rework, and faster completion of approved designs. Thus management levers such as oversight interact with intensity of customer signoffs.
We model this through the interaction variables OV-CUSTINT and SP-CUSTINT. This leads to the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1d: OV-CUSTINT (the variable representing interaction between OV and customer interaction) will have a positive influence on DES-SCHED.
Hypothesis 1e: SP-CUSTINT will have a positive influence on DES-SCHED
Next, we examine the second dependent variable: DES-SVNGS shown in column 2 of table 3.
This outcome variable represents the dollar savings during the design phase. While the overall financial performance of a project has been considered in the past e.g., (Ulrich et al. 1993; Ulrich and Pearson 1998) , our field study is the first work that examines systematically the financial performance of the design phase explicitly. In the case of products with complex designs (as in our study), the design phase consumes a significant percentage of the overall time and money.
We consider DES-SVNGS separately from DES-SCHED, as our interviews with senior management at CARCO revealed that faster completion of the design phase may or may not lead to net dollar savings. The hypothesized effects of OV, CUSTINT and the interaction variables OV-CUSTINT and SP-CUSTINT on DES-SVNGS are similar to the effects on DES-SCHED (hypotheses 2a, 2c, 2d and 2e in table 3). However, the direction of influence in hypothesis 2b differs from its counterpart 1b, as explained next.
In contrast to the posited favorable impact of SP on DES-SCHED (1b), the effect on DES-SVNGS involves tradeoffs. Managers can achieve faster completion of design tasks 8 with specialization but at the cost of higher outlays in the design phase. Specialized designers tend to command premium salaries. Hence, the direction of the impact of added specialization in the design phase can go either way. We hypothesize that while higher SP leads to time savings, it is achieved by more dollar outlays and hence the net effect of SP on design savings should be adverse. Hypothesis 2b asserts this adverse impact of SP below.
Hypothesis 2b: Higher values of SP will lead to lower values of DES-SVNGS.
The third dependent variable in our analysis is MFG-SCHED (shown in column 3 of table 3). It measures the conformance to the schedule in the manufacturing phase from a project 8 It should be noted that duration of the task here is the actual time the designers spend on the design tasks. In contrast, DES-SCHED is the conformance to the entire schedule in the design phase from a project management standpoint. The tradeoff we consider in hypothesis 2b refers to speedier processing using more expensive processors. management standpoint. Unlike in the design phase, higher OV is desirable from an assembly coordination standpoint. A greater degree of managerial oversight in the design phase would lead to better coordination amongst the designers, and hence easier assembly of the different components in the manufacturing phase. The complex nature of the products in the study amplifies the assembly problems that would result. Thus, we expect a net positive impact of OV on MFG-SCHED, as shown in hypothesis 3a below:
Hypothesis 3a: Higher levels of OV lead to higher values of MFG-SCHED.
In contrast, higher SP entails components being designed by different personnel, which can potentially lead to downstream assembly problems in manufacturing (shown in box M4 in figure   2 ). Quality hold-ups in manufacturing can also occur if tests reveal shortcomings in system performance. Thus while higher SP is desirable from a design schedule standpoint (hypothesis 1b), we hypothesize that lower SP is desirable from an assembly and testing standpoint:
Hypothesis 3b: Higher amounts of SP lead to lower amounts of MFG-SCHED.
A widely accepted view in the design for manufacturing (DFM) literature is that up front investment in design pays off in the subsequent manufacturing phase, both in terms of time and money. This implies that more investments in design time, if channeled to the right DFM activities, will have payoffs subsequently in manufacturing schedules. If investments in design time are spent on ineffective activities, from a manufacturing viewpoint, then downstream schedules could be potentially adversely affected. We posit the former effect, that manufacturing schedules are improved with greater time investments in design:
Hypothesis 3f: Lower values of DES-SCHED are associated with higher values of MFG-SCHED.
Referring to hypotheses 3a and 3f, note that we separate the effects of OV on MFG-SCHED into two components. The first is the net effect of OV on DES-SCHED, which in turn affects the MFG-SCHED. This is the ripple or indirect effect of OV on MFG-SCHED (note that DES-SCHED is affected by several variables besides OV). The second is the direct effect of OV on MFG-SCHED (independent of its ripple effect which was mediated by the DES-SCHED). A similar argument applies to SP (hypotheses 3b and 3f). 
Model
We propose the following system of equations to analyze the data. The model specification is based on the hypotheses development discussed earlier.
DES-SCHED = α 1 + β 11 OV + β 12 SP + β 13 CUSTINT + β 14 OV-CUSTINT+ β 15 SP-CUSTINT + ε 1 (1) DES-SVNGS = α 2 + β 21 OV + β 22 SP + β 23 CUSTINT + β 24 OV-CUSTINT+ β 25 SP-CUSTINT + ε 2 (2) MFG-SCHED = α 3 + β 31 OV + β 32 SP + β 33 DES-SCHED + ε 3 (3) MFG-SVNGS = α 4 + β 41 OV + β 42 SP + β 43 DES-SVNGS + ε 4 (4)
Note that equations (1) and (3) are related, as are equations (2) and (4) Thus, our structural model consists of essentially two sets of recursive equations, with one set modeling the linkages between the time metrics of the two phases, and the second set modeling the interdependencies of the financial metrics between the two phases. We can estimate equation (1) by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method and use the predicted values of the dependent variable DES-SCHED in equation (3) and estimate the resulting equation 9 . Likewise, the second set of equations linking DES-SVNGS to MFG-SVNGS can be estimated. Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients of the model. The values in parentheses are t-statistics.
Though the model has 2 sets of recursive equations, we can allow for the residuals of the equations in each set to be correlated and estimate the parameters allowing for such a correlation 10 . (see Appendix 1). We can also allow for the residuals to be correlated across all the equations (in a seemingly unrelated sense), but because of the large sample size required for such a procedure, we refrain from such specifications and prefer parsimony. (Theil 1971) and (Judge et al. 1985) for a discussion of the 2SLS analysis performed here. 10 In this case, we checked the rank and order conditions (Theil 1971 ).
Variables
DES-SCHED (Equation 1)
DES-SVNGS (Equation 2)
MFG-SCHED (Equation 3)
MFG-SVNGS
First, we discuss the estimates for the design phase (equations 1 and 2). As hypothesized, DES-SCHED is negatively affected by OV (hypothesis 1a, β 11 = -9.38), and CUSTINT (hypothesis 1c, (β 13 = -15.25). As expected, SP is seen to have a positive impact on DES-SCHED (β 12 = 6.62, hypothesis 1b). Furthermore, the interaction terms of OV-CUSTINT and SP-CUSTINT both impact the DES-SCHED favorably (β 14 = 5.38, β 15 = 6.26). Thus hypotheses 1a-e are all supported by the estimated model. The data however supports some of the hypotheses for equation 2 (for the dependent variable DES-SVNGS). We find strong support for hypothesis 2a (β 21 = -160.99), implying that higher levels of OV lead to lower savings. We find support for the contra of hypothesis 2b (β 22 = 342.2), implying that higher levels of specialization generate more savings in the design phase. We did not find support for hypotheses 2c, 2d and 2e, indicating no evidence that CUSTINT, OV-CUSTINT and SP-CUSTINT impact the financial performance in the design phase.
Next, we move to the equations for the manufacturing phase. The results for equation 3 (for the dependent variable MFG-SCHED) show lack of support for hypotheses 3a and 3b, implying no empirical evidence to support the hypothesized direct effects of OV and SP on MFG-SCHED.
However, there is significant support for hypothesis 3f (β 35 = -16.7), implying that upstream time investments (slippage in design phase) translate to downstream time savings in the manufacturing phase. Conventional project scheduling would suggest that a slippage in design would result in further delaying downstream activities. The negative sign of β 35 implies just the opposite. The magnitude also suggests that downstream gains are amplified 11 . Finally, for equation 4 (dependent variable MFG-SVNGS), we find support for both hypotheses 4a and 4b, in the directions expected. Thus, OV affects MFG-SVNGS positively (β 41 = 13.53), while SP affects it negatively (β 42 = -26.45). Finally, we find support for hypothesis 4g (β 43 = -7.84), indicating that higher expenditures in design reduce downstream manufacturing costs The managerial implications of this system of equations are described next.
Managerial Implications
Our empirical findings have significant implications for deploying the appropriate managerial levers during the design phase for NPD. We discuss below the insights that our model provides with respect to these levers in the design phase: managerial oversight, specialization and intensity of customer interaction.
Oversight:
As can be seen from the system of equations, OV has three types of impact on the outcome metrics. These are: a) the direct impact, b) the interaction impact and c) the ripple impact of OV via intermediate metrics. We explain each of these next, in the context of figure 4 . Note that the estimates show that in contrast to its adverse direct impact, increased oversight, when coupled with increased customer interaction (impact b) is beneficial for the DES-SCHED. Project managers can leverage the customer interaction to impart a holistic perspective during the design phase. This systems approach leads to better co-ordinated design activities, and lower levels of iterative design. This supports the discussion in (Iansiti 1998 ) regarding the T role of project managers, who can bridge external system requirements, to internal development and achieve better schedule performance in design.
Finally, OV has a ripple impact c) on downstream manufacturing metrics. For instance, MFG-SCHED is impacted by DES-SCHED, which in turn is affected by OV, arising from . This is because of greater efficiency on the part of specialist designers. Even though specialist designers get paid more, this is more than offset by the increased efficiency from sub-system specialization in design.
The interaction effect of SP with CUSTINT is also positive on DES-SCHED. This implies that specialists are able to use the input from customers to develop sub systems faster.
However, the ripple effect of SP on downstream manufacturing is found to be adverse, from both a schedule and a financial standpoint. We attribute this to the narrow focus of specialists on their own sub-systems, and consequent escalations in assembly costs in the manufacturing phase. Similar to the discussion on oversight above, our estimates suggest that, from a financial perspective, the intensity of SP should be reduced as long as design budgets are less than a critical ratio 13 .
The implications of this study therefore are to select lower levels of specialization and higher levels of oversight for leveraging the payoffs downstream in manufacturing at the expense of higher resource consumption in design. Our findings reinforce the DFM philosophy, and identify the levers in design that project managers can use to exploit inter-phase dependencies in NPD. We also caution that the directional change depends upon the relative resource consumption in the two phases. In our study, the critical ratio analysis indicates an overwhelming bias towards reaping benefits in manufacturing through increased oversight and reduced specialization in the design phase. The strategy of lever selection is shown in 
High oversight Low Specialization
The Effects of Customer Interaction
The effects of customer interaction during design has two opposing effects. The direct impact of CUSTINT on DES-SCHED is adverse, suggesting that increased customer contact does impose a burden in terms of delays in the first phase. The interaction impact of CUSTINT however, mitigates this direct impact, as seen from the positive values of β 14 and β 15 . For a 13 Similar to the computation for the critical ratio for OV, the critical ratio for SP from a financial performance standpoint, is: =(β 42 + β 43 * β 22 ) / β 22 given level of OV and SP, the net marginal impact of higher intensity of CUSTINT is (β 13 + β 14 *OV + β 15 * SP). In our study, the net impact of CUSTINT at the mean values of the levers was barely negative (-0.1394). The magnitude indicates that the direct and the interaction effects almost cancel each other. While on one hand, activities related to customer interaction do delay the schedule, project managers and specialist designers are able to leverage these interactions with customers and accrue gains. The interaction of CUSTINT with OV leverages customer inputs from a systems perspective (brought by project managers). The interaction with SP likewise helps in speedier completion of sub system design by specialist designers. Note that despite a slightly negative net effect on DES-SCHED, the ripple effect on manufacturing is positive, as seen from the negative value of β 33 .
The implication therefore, from a schedule management standpoint, is to increase the level of customer interaction, and exploit the ripple effect. From the cost performance perspective, we observe an adverse direct impact of CUSTINT on DES-SVNGS, though it is not significant in our study.
Positioning Strategy: Locating The Sweet Spot and Sensitivity Analyses
Our study provides compelling evidence for a directional change in the levers chosen by project managers in the design phase. Figure 6 summarizes the recommendations that result from our estimated model, as applied to typical NPD projects. These are characterized by significant resource deployment in manufacturing, in terms of both time and money. We recommend higher levels of managerial oversight, reduced intensity of specialization and greater intensity of customer interaction by both the project manager and specialist designers.
Increased oversight leads to better coordination across designers. This increased coordination implies better sharing of information across designers working on individual sub-systems. From an assembly standpoint, this improved information-sharing results in cost savings in the assembly portion of manufacturing. Thus, even though this strategy entails greater commitment of resources in the design phase, payoffs are accrued downstream in manufacturing. Our findings reinforce concepts of DFM and highlight the levers that project managers can use during the design phase. Decreasing specialization mitigates assembly problems in the manufacturing phase, even though it leads to greater resource consumption in design.
Our model teases out the contrasting influences of customer interactions, both within the design phase and across the two phases. Within the design phase, there are both positive and negative impacts. Higher intensities of customer interaction are associated with more slippage, with designers spending time on extraneous activities related to customer interaction. However this negative impact is offset by the beneficial effects of project managers and specialists utilizing customer input. While, the overall impact of customer interaction in the design phase is negative, across the two phases, the ripple effect on manufacturing time performance is positive 14 . From a project management standpoint, the net impact of customer interaction depends on the relative resources in design and manufacturing. In most NPD environments, such as in our study, manufacturing resource consumption drives overall NPD project performance. In such cases, our model recommends a higher intensity of customer interaction in the design phase.
We caution however, that the direction of the overall strategy in figure 6 depends on the relative resources to be deployed in design and manufacturing. Our model suggests a reversal of the recommended strategy for NPD projects where the design phase dominates the time and cost resource consumption. This would arise in new products which are innovative assemblies of purchased parts. In such environments, we recommend reduced managerial oversight, increased intensity of specialization in design. The intensity of customer interaction in such environments should be selectively reduced by project managers, to mitigate the adverse direct effects. One possible approach is to impose transaction costs on each interaction with the customer, thereby reducing the frequency of low content exchanges.
OVERSIGHT (OV) SPECIALIZATION (SP)
Higher CUST Interaction Lower CUST Interaction Figure 6 . Recommended Changes in Levers for Typical NPD Projects.
Our estimates also allow us to gauge the sensitivity of project performance to the managerial levers. Table 5 shows the changes overall project schedule and financial performance 15 , for a 5% increase in the respective levers, which are shown in column 1. The sensitivity analysis highlights the magnitude of the impact of each driver. The impact is shown at the overall project level, based on the average resource allocation between the design and manufacturing phases of projects. 
Limitations And Future Work
One limitation of our study is the sample size. The specific and important information on the control variables enables us to provide significant managerial guidelines. Yet, such useful data collection often comes with the caveat of limited sample that restricts us from performing more rigorous analysis. For example, given the cross sectional nature of the analysis, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through project specific intercepts would have been appropriate. Even a parsimonious random-effects cannot be applied due to lack of multiple observations for each project. We take comfort, however, from the fact that the parameter estimates are quite stable across specifications.
Another limitation is that our conclusions are based on analysis within a firm. A broader crosssection of firms would enhance our ability to generalize. However, we believe the results are generalizable across firms, because the projects in our data set a) were executed on geographically dispersed sites, b) were managed by a variety of project managers, c) were executed across time and d) had a variety of customers.
In this work, we believe that we have taken an important step in studying the impact on cost and lead time due to operational and marketing factors. In future, we hope to collect similar data across other firms as well. The richer data set will enable us to more comprehensively support the findings reported here. Increasingly, technology enabled product management development tools play a pivotal role in coordinating across functions in the NPD process. We shall examine this issue in a future research effort.
